الصومال بين البلقنة وخيار الفيدرالية المتوازنة

Africa’s problem was – and still is – the false starts of governance and development policies. According to the French socialist René Damon, who published a book to this effect in 1962, the continuing backwardness in Africa was not due to unfavorable natural conditions but rather due to the failure of the regimes in both the colonial and post-colonial periods to adopt more appropriate policies with regard to technology, agriculture, industrialization, education and development. Civil service, the role of foreign aid and regional integration. Dumont’s reading—who shook the international aid community and inspired Julius Nyerere, Tanzania’s founder and president, to embrace the bold development strategies expressed in the 1967 Arusha Declaration—remains relevant today. It is clear that the Somali crisis, thirty years after the 1991 civil war, continues to repeat the concept of false starts. Despite the influx of international aid and interventions, the country is unable to develop a functional governance structure capable of providing security and other basic services to citizens. The federal option, in its incomplete and politicized form, did not achieve political stability. Is it possible to talk about reconsidering the federal option again, or will the way be paved for more Balkanization and the establishment of independent tribal states within a loose confederation framework?

Peace abroad and reconciliation at home

The first false start was international interventions and the adoption of reconciliation initiatives imposed from abroad. After the collapse of the central government, Somalis headed towards neighboring countries, near and far, to hold dialogue and reconciliation conferences, which ended with the acceptance of the Arta/Djibouti formula. In forming the transitional federal government, the “4.5” power-sharing principle was accepted, which divides the Somali clans into four main clans and gives all the remaining clans a “0.5” ratio. This formula enshrined tribalism in the proposed political system and failed to gain the support of both Somaliland and Puntland. In exchange for this externally imposed peace, the expanded local and regional reconciliation processes in Somaliland and Puntland enabled the establishment of relatively peaceful and stable frameworks and policies . There is no doubt that these local initiatives among Somali communities demonstrate a demand for security, law and order. It also demonstrates the ability of Somali communities, in the absence of a state, to control and manage violent conflict through negotiated consensus-based approaches. This is reflected in commitments to shared responsibility, ceasefire management and security. In these respects, Somali-led peace operations demonstrate a degree of sophistication and pragmatism that has been lacking in state-sponsored, foreign-assisted efforts in the Somali context. This is the first lesson that has not been learned from within the Somali experience itself.

When former Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo was elected head of the Somali Federal Government in 2017, many – including the author of these lines – hailed his victory. Unlike his predecessors, Farmajo was seen as a consensual leader who could unite the country because he had a nationalist mindset and was someone who was not influenced by clan interests. The man inherited a corrupt and dysfunctional state, torn apart by deep tribal and factional divisions, and besieged from all sides by the Al-Shabaab movement despite the presence of the African Union Mission (AMISOM). Unfortunately, Farmajo’s rule, which officially ended on February 8, did not lead to a major shift in Somali governance structures or politics. On the contrary, his open hostility to the leaders of the federal regions – particularly Jubaland and Puntland, his desire to concentrate power in his hands and his biases regarding Somalia’s regional politics have led to a decline in his popularity, putting Somalia back in the position of false starts.

Farmaajo today rules without a popular mandate, and the main opposition groups have announced that they will not recognize him as head of state because he failed to organize general elections that were scheduled to be held this month (February 2021). It is no secret that this apparent power vacuum is a secondary issue for anyone who knows the course of events in Somalia, as the president is merely a figurehead. Because he does not exercise real authority. The government in Mogadishu cannot control most of the country, with its affairs largely run by clans and federal regions. National security matters are largely handled by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), rather than the Somali National Army.

Conditional withdrawal

تطرح “أميصوم” تكراراً لمسلسل البدايات الخاطئة في الصومال. تقترب ولاية بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال من نهايتها. إذ من المقرر خروجها في ديسمبر 2021، بعد أن مدد مجلس الأمن التابع للأمم المتحدة الموعد النهائي الذي كان مقرراً في 28 فبراير. ولكن يعتمد الانسحاب الناجح لقوات البعثة على الاستقرار السياسي في الصومال، وهو أمر عصى على التحقق في ظل الأزمة المتصاعدة التي تشهدها البلاد. وفقاً لخطة الصومال الانتقالية لعام 2017، التي أقرها مجلس السلام والأمن التابع للاتحاد الأفريقي ومجلس الأمن الدولي، يجب تلبية عدد من الأولويات المهمة قبل مغادرة بعثة الاتحاد الإفريقي. يشمل ذلك بناء القدرات المؤسسية وتوفير الدعم المادي واللوجستي لقوات الأمن في الصومال. على أن أهداف الخطة طموحة للغاية بحيث يتعذر تحقيقها في غضون الإطار الزمني المحدد. علاوة على ذلك، ثمة عوامل أخرى تسهم في تأجيج حدة الأزمة الداخلية في الصومال مثل تفاقم عدم الاستقرار السياسي والتهديدات الأمنية والخلافات الدبلوماسية بين الصومال وكينيا وجيبوتي. لا تزال حركة الشباب تشكل تهديداً كبيراً في البلاد وخارجها، وقد زادت من هجماتها، خاصة اعتباراً من أغسطس 2020. وتقدم حركة الشباب في الواقع نوعاً من “الحوكمة” في المناطق التي تسيطر عليها – حتى لو كانت الضرائب يتم جمعها من خلال الابتزاز أو التهديد بالعنف. يأتي ذلك في ظل غياب الدولة التي أضحت سراباً بالنسبة لمعظم الصوماليين الذين يحكمهم إما القانون العرفي الـ”حَيْر” أو الشريعة.

تأثير المساعدات

في كتابها عن المساعدات المميتة، تطرح دامبيسا مويو رؤية نقدية لصناعة المساعدات الأجنبية – وتصفها بأنها ليست فعالة فحسب، بل “خبيثة”. فعلى الرغم من تقديم أكثر من تريليون دولار من المساعدات التنموية لإفريقيا في الخمسين عاماً الماضية، إلا أن هذه المساعدات فشلت في تحقيق النمو الاقتصادي المستدام والحد من الفقر – وجعلت القارة أسوأ حالاً. ينطبق ذلك يقيناً على الصومال، حيث لم تفض الجهود التي تبذلها الأمم المتحدة والمجتمع الدولي إلى تحقيق ما يشبه الحوكمة من خلال إنشاء المؤسسات اللازمة للحكومة والتي تعمل بكفاءة. لقد كانت هذه المساعدات الخارجية ذات نتائج عكسية لأنها رسخت الفساد في الحكومة (حيث سرق المسئولون الفاسدون الكثير من المساعدات) وأبطأت تعافي الصومال واستقراره. كما كان تدخل إثيوبيا تحديداً أبرز أسباب زعزعة استقرار الصومال. لقد  أدى الغزو الإثيوبي للصومال المدعوم من الولايات المتحدة في عام 2006 إلى الإطاحة بحكم اتحاد المحاكم الإسلامية بزعامة شيخ شريف. ومن المعروف أن حكومة شيخ شريف نجحت في تحقيق ما يشبه الفترة الذهبية في حكم الصومال بعد سياد بري من خلال إقامة تحالف من رجال الدين ورجال الأعمال المسلمين. ولا يخفى كذلك أن التدخل الإثيوبي أدى إلى ظهور جماعات متطرفة مثل حركة الشباب المجاهدين التي أحدثت الفوضى في أرجاء الصومال منذ ذلك الحين. على أن سيادة الصومال لم تنتهك من قبل أثيوبيا وحدها فقد كان لتدخل كينيا في الصومال في عام 2011 تأثير مماثل، حيث وسّعت حركة الشباب نشاطها الإرهابي ليشمل الأراضي الكينية.

ما العمل؟

Can Somalia be saved by adopting a state-building approach based on local initiatives, such as what happened in Somaliland, and building a strong democratic state based on the principle of one vote for each individual instead of the current clan formula? Or should we accept the fait accompli logic, where Somalia is divided into What is it like for self-governing city-states to be better able to govern themselves? Several experts have proposed a basic approach in this context, whereby the country is divided into six local administrative structures in semi-autonomous regions defined wholly or partly by clan affiliation. The Isaak clan dominates Somaliland in the northwest; The two galaxies dominate Puntland in the northeast; Jubaland and Gedo, bordering Kenya, will also include a number of heterogeneous clans; In return, the identity will control central Somalia. In the end, Mogadishu will remain an administrative center that expresses the symbolism of the Somali nation . However, the federal formula proposed in this approach remains a source of disagreement in light of the efforts of Villa Somalia (the center of the presidential institution) aimed at supporting the authority of the center at the expense of the regions.

There is another path that some experts have called for based on the experience of the previous Yugoslav approach. Didn’t the “Dayton Accords” of 1995, which ended the Bosnian war, pave the way for ethnic Balkanization in the former Yugoslavia through the establishment of six countries? This ultimately led to peace, stability and prosperity. Some may argue that this option may eliminate the threat of Al-Shabaab mujahideen and allow the return of Somali refugees in Kenya, Ethiopia and the diaspora. However, the dream of a unified Somalia remains the best option, but according to new rules that uphold the values ​​of equal citizenship and clearly define the functions of both the center and the peripheries through a fair federal relationship.